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ABSTRACT
JOB PERFORMANCE, TURNOVER AND WAGE GROWTH
The paper tests and finds strong support for the hypothesis that in the
nonunion sector of the economy, turnover is negatively selective on a
~orker's job performance. At establishments with about 17 employees, a
worker who is one standard deviation (21 percent) less productive than
average during the first few months on the job is 11 percentage points
more likely to be laid off or fired and 7 percentage points more likely
to quit during the succeeding year. At large nonunion establishments and
in small labor markets, productivity has very large effects on risks of
.
an involuntary separation but almost no effect on the propensity to quit.
Productivity appears to be positively related to layoffs and quits at
unionized establishments.
I. Introduction
When an employment contract is initiated, neither party knows how well the match
is going to turn out As the match is experienced, some workers are discovered to be less
productive than others and some are discovered to be more productive. This may cause
the employer or employee to become dissatisfied with the terms of the original agreement.
A common contract form has the more reliable party -- the employer -- promising to give
larger wage increases to the more productive workers. For those with about one year of
tenure at the rum, relative wage rates are influenced by contemporaneous measures of
relative productivity even when background characteristics are controlled. The response is
not very large, however. The elasticity of wage rates with respect to a supervisory
assessments of productivity on a ratio scale is only .2 at establishments with 17 employees
and roughly zero at nonunion establishments with 400 or more employees (Bishop 1987).
A number of reasons have been proposed for the apparent preference of workers
and employers for contracts which limit how contingent pay is on individual job
performance: the unreliability of the feasible measures of individual productivity
(Hashimoto and Yu 1980), risk aversion on the part of workers (Stiglitz 1974), productivity
differentials that are specific to the firm (Bishop 1987), the desire to encourage cooperation
by coworkers (Lazear 1986) and union preferences for pay structures which limit the power
of supervisors. In addition, rewards for better than average job performance may be
stretched out over many years or come in non-pecuniary forms - praise from one's
supervisor, more relaxed supervision, or a high rank in the firm's social hierarchy (Frank
1984).
2The other way employers may respond to productivity differentials between workers
is by promoting the most productive and fuing the least productive (Banon and
Loewenstein 1985). Many employment contracts (both explicit and implicit) limit the
fmn's flexibility in setting wage rates but offer it great flexibility in releasing unproductive
new hires during a probationary period that may last as long as 6 months or a year. One
reason why fmns fire less-productive workers rather than offering them a lower wage is
that it can be very costly to individually negotiate wages each year. As a worker gains
tenure on the job, the specificity of the job match increases. Renegotiating wage rates
after specifIc training is completed will be very costly because the gap between the threat
points of each party can be quite large and the incentives for strategic behavior are strong
(Hashimoto and Yu 1981).
A second reason for such contracts might be morale considerations. Retaining an
unproductive worker who has been chastened by receiving a salary cut or demotion may be
bad for morale. The bitterness that such an event causes may result in grievances being
filed against the company, efforts to organize a union, further declines in the worker's
productivity, damage to the morale and cohesiveness of the work group, and sabotage
(Akerlof 1982).
This paper examines the impact of differentials in realized productivity on the
differentials in turnover and promotion of new hires occupying the same job. In the
process we expect to gain a better understanding of the reason for the weak response of
wage rates to relative productivity. To the extent that the small effect of differentials in
relative productivity on within-fmn relative wage rates is attributed to the unreliability of
productivity measures, to worker risk aversion or to union pressure, turnover and
3promotions would be expected to be equally unresponsive to measures of productivity. On
the other hand, if the primary cause of the weak response of wages to productivity is the
specificity of worker skills, the need to promote worker cooperation," or the value placed
on relative status in the finn, one would expect productivity differentials between
coworkers of equal tenure to have much larger effects on turnover and promotions than on
within-flI111relative wage rates. If rewards for exceptional perfonnance are stretched out
over many years in order to generate incentives for the most capable to stay and for the
least capable to leave voluntarily, we would also expect productivity differentials to have
strong effects on both turnover and promotions.
Consequently, findings regarding the response of turnover to relative Productivity
have implications for the important theoretical issue of why it is efficient for employers to
~
limit the degree to which job perfonnance effects pay. If turnover, promotions and wage
rates are all unresponsive to relative productivity, the inference will be that the cause of
productivity's small impact is probably measurement error, risk aversion and/or union
pressure. If dismissals, quits and promotions are all responsive to differentials in job
perfonnance, the inference will be that immediate rewards for outstanding job perfonnance
are modest because (1) rewards are postponed in order to induce negatively selective
attrition, (2) wage differentials between coworkers are kept to a minimum to encourage
cooperation, (3) wage differentials .need not be great because the perfonnance differentials
are specific to the finn and/or (4) wage differentials need not be great because other fonns
of compensation (eg. praise, perks, and high relative status in the finn) suffice to reward
and retain outstanding employees.
4The extent to which turnover is negatively selective on realized relative productivity
is also quite imponant to job-worker matching models of turnover and wage growth. If
"wages always equal expected marginal products for all workers, the [matching] model
generates (an average) wage growth as tenure increases" (Jovanovic 1979, p. 974). The
sorting/matching model offers an explanation of rising wages with age and tenure at a firm
that is thought by some to be a potential substitute for the theory of on-the-job training.
In his recent review of the empirical studies of job matching, John Garen (1988)
concluded:
The evidence surveyed in this paper does not reveal any consensus about the
importance of the job matching model. The results from the studies of wage
determination are mixed. Some of the fmdings imply that matching accounts
for nearly all of the wage-tenure correlation, while others suggest only a part
is explained by this model.
Garen attributes the inconclusiveness of the empirical work on the subject to the fact that
"it is an argument about detenninants of wages and turnover that are not observed with
currently available data, i. e., the quality of the worker-fmn match. If it were observed,
the controversy is easily settled by entering such a variable into the estimation."
This paper analyzes a unique data set which contains measures of one component of the
quality of the match between job and worker--the reported productivity of the individual
worker relative to coworkers. The paper conducts the simple and robust test of job
matching theory that Garen proposes. Sorting's effect on the growth of wages with tenure
will be directly measured by determining the degree to which turnover selects out the poor
performers and by calculating how much of the general rise in average productivity with
early tenure is due to the sorting phenomenon.
5The paper also examines how the response of turnover and promotions to
productivity differentials varies across establishments and what causes this variation.
Bishop's (1987) study of the effects of productivity on relative wage rates found that the
wages were least responsive at unionized plants, at large establishments and in small
communities. These same interactions will be tested in the turnover analysis. Unions
press for seniority based layoffs and promotions and restrict the fmns ability to dismiss
workers. We hypothesize, therefore, that unions reduce the dependence of involuntary
turnover and promotions on relative job performance. Our earlier paper suggested that the
smaller responses of wages to productivity at large plants and in small communities was
primarily due to the greater firm specificity of productivity differentials at large fmns and
in small communities. Skills are more fmn specific in small labor markets because each
fmn has fewer local competitors. If this is the case, we would expect involuntary turnover
to be more responsive to productivity differentials at large finns and in small communities.
Walter Oi (1983) and Banon, Black and Loewenstein (1987) suggest instead that large
establishments have different turnover behavior because of their higher monitoring costs.
These hypotheses will be tested below.
The analysis will also yield insights into the causes of voluntary turnover. Some
portion of the observed differences in productivity between workers in a job are not
specific to the match but are instead the outcome of unobserved differences in general
ability. Fama (1980) has observed that "When the fmn's reward system is not responsive
to performance ... the best are the first to leave." Fama's hypothesis predicts that at large
unionized establishments in small communities (the environment, where wages do not
respond to productivity) greater productivity will be associated with higher quit rates. All
,.. --.41.-.
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of these hypothesis are to be tested.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper describes the data
set employed in the analysis and presents and discusses tabulations of the reponed
productivity of new hires by whether there has been a separation and by the type of
separation. The third section presents the paper's analysis of the effects of match quality
on voluntary and involuntary turnover. Section 4 examines the effect of match quality on
promotions. Section 5 summarizes the findings and presents estimates of the effect of the
negative selectivity of turnover on the growth of the mean productivity of workers as
tenure increases.
n. Data and Specification
The NCRVE Employer Survey conducted in the late Spring of 1982 provides a
unique data set for examining how the quality of the match between job and worker effects
turnover. It provides retrospectively longitudinal data on the wage rates, turnover and
reponed productivity of 3377 new hires at 2594 different fmns. Most of the respondents
were the owner/manager of small finns who were quite familiar with the perfonnance of
each of the finn's employees. At larger fums interviews were typically conducted with
both the personnel director and a line supervisor. The personnel director provided
infonnation on the company and the background of the employees selected for study and
the supervisor provided data on the training costs and productivity of the individuals. The
data is described in greater detail in the appendix.
A unique feature of this data set was the effort (that was successful in 659 cases) to
obtain data on nm recent hires. The flI"stmember of the pair of recently hired employees
was obtained by asking the main respondent to select "the last new employee your
7company hired prior to August 1981 reiardless of whether that person is still employed by
your company." The second member of the pair was obtained by asking the employer to
select "another employee you hU'ed[within the past 2 years] for the same or similar
position but with some prior vocational training." In the event the first person selected had
prior vocational training, the second person selected was not to have had such training.
While the data set does include some professional and managerial employees. high
level jobs tend to be under represented because it is a sample of new hires not employees
and accession rates are lower in high level jobs and because establishments in low wage
industries were over sampled by the survey. Relative to their share of all employment,
large establishments, low turnover establishments and companies that never hire
vocationally trained workers are also under represented. While the jobs and
establishments studied are not randomly selected, once the job is selected, the selection of
new hires for study appears to be close to random if one abstracts from the fact that the
two new hires are selected to have different amounts of vocational training and the second
new hire selected was hired an average of 6 months earlier.l
The survey asked the employer (or in larger finns the immediate supervisor) to
report on productivity of the typical individual hired in the job after 2 weeks, during the
next 11 weeks and at the end of 2 years at the fmn. The supervisor was asked to do the
rating on a "scale of zero to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of
your employees in (NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by
your employee." For the full data set at the mean values of these indexes of reponed
productivity were 49.0 for the flISt 2 weeks, 64.6 for the next 11 weeks and 81.4 at the
time of the interview.
8The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired employees were
intended to provide ratio scale indicators of the relative productivity of one worker at
different points in time or two different workers in a particular job. They do not attempt
to measure productivity in any absolute sense and therefore are not comparable across
fmns or across jobs in a finn. The question asking for a rating of the productivity of
particular workers have remarkably low nonresponse rates. Only 4.4 percent of respondents
asked about a particular new hire's productivity during the first 2 weeks responded with a
"don't know" or refused to answer. Comparably defined nonresponse rates for other
questions about the new hire were 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 3.2 percent
for age, 6.7 for education, 8.6 percent for time spent in informal training by a supervisor,
and 5.7 percent for a 3-question sequence from which starting wage rate is calculated. The
-' low nonresponse rate implies that our respondents felt that they were capable of making
such judgments and augurs well for the quality of the data that results.
The fact that the employer is reporting on the past productivity of particular
employees may generate biases in the data. Some of these employees quit or were fired,
some were promoted and some were awarded substantial wage increases. These events
might influence our respondent's memory of how productive the worker was during the
fU'Stthree months on the job. If this occurs, it would probably magnify the estimated
effect of early productivity on subsequent turnover and current wage rates. In Bishop
(1987) early productivity did not have significant positive effects on the current wage when
current productivity was controlled so this does not appear to be a problem for the current
wage rate models. The second potential source of bias--measurement error in the
productivity indicators--acts in the opposite direction. It has no effect on table I and 4 but
.1
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it does bias the productivity indicator coefficients toward zero in the multivariate analysis
presented in tables 2 and 3. With these caveats in mind, let us turn to the results.
Table 1 compares the productivity ratings (during the 3rd through 13th week at the
finn) of new hires who separate to the productivity ratings (for week 3-13) of the 70
percent of new hires who stay at the finn at least through the date of the interview.
Dismissed workers are considerably less productive (25 percent less in week 3-13) than
workers who stay at the firm. This is true for all tyPes of fmns. For other tyPes of
turnover, however, there are important differences across tyPes of establishments in the
selectivity of turnover. At unionized establishments the individuals who were laid off or
who quit were reported to be ~ productive during week 3-13 than the workers who
were retained. Fired workers were reported to be substantially less productive, but,
consistent with the results of other studies (Freeman and Medoff 1984), very few (only 2.7
percent of the new hires) were fired. As a result, it would appear that total turnover may
not be negatively selective at these unionized establishments.
The large (200+ employees) nonunion establishments also had low dismissal rates
(3.0 percent), and who was laid off appeared to be unrelated to job performance for the
laid off workerswere reported to be 9 percent J11Qnt productive (during week 3-13) than
those retained. The largest group of separating employees, those who quit were also
reported to be slightly more productive than the stayers. As a result, total turnover of new
employees at large nonunion establishments appears to have only a very weak negative
correlation with job performance. Thus, at the unionized and large nonunion establishments
where compensation does not appear to be responsive to performance, positively selective
quitting behavior appears to prevail, just as Fama predicted. It would also appear that
10
while dismissals are clearly negatively selective, turnover as a whole may not be.
Consequently, Jovanovic's job matching model may not apply to this sector of the labor
market
It is the small and medium sized nonunion establishments that appear to have
negatively selective turnover. Discharge rates are higher at these fmns, layoffs appear to
be partly based on job performance (at small establishments) and, most important of all,
the workers who are least productive appear to have somewhat higher quit rates. It would
appear that the relatively modest response of relative wage rates to relative productivity
documented in Bishop (1987) is sufficient to generate negatively selective quitting behavior.
Since turnover is clearly negatively selective, Jovanovic's job matching model appears to
be a good characterization of turnover behavior in this segment of the labor market
There are, however, reasons for being cautious when interpreting table 1. The table
implicitly compares the reported productivity of people at different firms and in different
jobs. Yet, the question was not intended as a measure of relative productivity across jobs
and fums. Different employers have different rating standards. For example, an employer
who has a generally negative view of the world may give all his employees a low rating
and may, in addition, be more prone to fire them. H so, the numbers in table 1 would be
biased. The paper develops and implements a method of testing hypotheses about the
selectivity of turnover that are free of biases caused by unobserved differences in jobs or
raters.
The solution involves estimating models which compare two workers hired for the
same or a very similar job. Differences in their productivity and required training during
the first three months in the job are used to predict differences in subsequent tenure,
11
turnover and -promotions. By analyzing differences in turnover between pairs of workers
hired for the same job, the problem of comparing productivity across finns and jobs is
avoided and the effects of the finn, the job and the supervisor's personality are held
constant through what amounts to a fixed effects procedure.' Limiting the sample to those
who stayed at the fmn at least three months means that a measure of training investment
and two measures of productivity during the first three months are available that are not
contaminated by turnover events. The models, therefore, characterize the effect of the
training provided in the fIrSt three months and the productivity achieved during that period
on subsequent turnover and promotions.4
Models were estimated predicting differences in the log of actual tenure and
probabilities of voluntary and involuntary separations. The specification employed is given
below:
(1) In(ATlATJ = a1(Pl-PJ + a2(TI-TJ + a,ln(PTIIPT2) +
a..[(lnPT1)2-(lnPTJ2j + A(XI-XJ + as + u
(2) (FI-F2,QI-QJ =b1(P1-P2) + b2(TI-TJ + b,ln(PTIIPTJ +
b4[(lnPT1)2-OnPTJ2] + B(X1-XJ + bs + v
where ATl.AT2 = the actual tenure of person 1 and 2. ITthe worker
separates, AT is the time between date of hire and date of separation. Otherwise
AT=PT.
F1.F2= zero one dummies indicating whether person 1 or 2 was laid off or f1red.
Ql,(6 =zero one dummies indicating whether person 1 or 2 quit
P1-P2 =The difference between person l's productivity and person 2's productivity
during the fIrSt 3 months at the fmn.
-,,'_.'---'
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T}-T2 = the'difference between person l's required training time and person 2's
required training time.
P1\,PT2 = the potential tenure of person 1 and 2. Potential tenure is the calender
time between date of hire and date of interView.
X}-X2 = a vector of differences in credentials, background characteristics and job
characteristics between person 1 and 2.
12
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Ill. Detenninants of Turnover
The results of estimating (1) and (2) are presented in Table 2. Since the intercept
tcnns are not significantly different from zero, we may reject the hypothesis that the small
differences betWeen the selection protocols for person 1 and person 2 have resulted in
unobserved differences in turnover propensities (ie. that cannot be attributed to the
differences in background and job perfonnance that are included in the model).
When the analysis is conditioned on the job, firm and labor market, turnover
outcomes for those who survive at least three months in a job are detennined by the
worker's performance on the job--a measure of the employer component of match quality,
not background characteristics that proxy for alternative opportunities or the worker taste
for the job. The background and credentials of the new hire are represented by 9
variables--gender, years of schooling, a dummy for received relevant vocational education, a
dummy for received vocational education at a private for-profit technical institute, a dummy
for being hired as part of a cooperative education program, relevant work experience and
its square, and total work experience and its square. In the tenure equation only one of
the background characteristics -- cooperative education student - is significant at the 10
percent level. In the involuntary separation equation only schooling is significant and it
has the wrong sign (greater schooling is associated with a higher probability of dismissal).
In the quit equation only the gender dummy is significant. Women have significantly
lower quit rates. F tests found that the simultaneous entry of these nine variables into
each model does not significantly increase the explanatory power of the regression. The
predominance of the variables measuring supervisory assessments of productivity is
consistent with a matching model of job turnover in which jobs are experience goods such
- --- - - - -. J_-- -
-
14
as the one developed by Jovanovic (1979). The poor showing of the credentials variables
representing alternative opponunities and tastes in the quit equation suggests that the
original contract between the new hire and the firm may have been fine tuned to eliminate
predictable differences in quit rates between new hires. The poor showing of the credential
i"".f.,,+-ry
variables in the ",separation equation.' may suggest that most finns indeed follow their
announced policy of basing dismissals and layoffs on tenure and job perfonnance only, not
the worker's background.
Productivity Effects
By contrast, the key measure of the employer component of match quality, the new
hire's productivity in the 3rd through 12th week of employment, has large and significant
effects in all 3 equations. The productivity variables range between zero and one. The
means are .51 for the fIrst two weeks of employment and .661 for the next 11 weeks. The
within-fmn standard deviation of productivity during the 3rd through 13th week is .143. A
one standard deviation increase iri productivity during this period lowers the probability of
an involuntary separation by 11 percentage points, lowers the probability of a quit by 7
percentage points, and increases tenure by 42 percent (exp(.35». If both productivity
variables increase simultaneously, the response of involuntary separations to productivity
becomes somewhat larger but the response of quit rates and tenure diminish. A one
standard deviation increase in both productivity variables decreases involuntary separation
probabilities by 13.5 percentage points, quit probabilities by 2.2 percentage points and
increases tenure by 25 percent (exp(.22». In other words, turnover during the 2nd, 3rd and
later quaners of employment depends on productivity at the end not the beginning of the
first quarter. If the worker stays to the end of the first quarter, low initial productivity
, .
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levels are forgiven. In fact, rapid improvements in productivity appear to improve morale,
for quit rates decline and tenure increases. The fact that tenure goes up when reported
productivity is higher suggests that the productivity differentials betWeen workers largely
reflect differences in skills that are specific to the firm or known only to the firm. This
interpretation is supported by Topel and Ward's (1987) finding that within career
innovations to wages have substantial effects on turnover.
Training Differential Effects
The primary prediction of human capital theory about job turnover is that workers
who have a great deal of specific training should have lower rates of turnover (Parsons
1975). This proposition applies to workers who have completed their training or whose
training is well underway. If the employer has paid for most of the costs of specific
training, we would expect involuntary separations to be negatively related to the amount of
specific training. If the employee has paid for most of the specific training, we would
expect voluntary separations to be negatively related to the amount of specific training.
Either way tenure should rise.
When, however, one compares new hires for a particular job, differences in training
received during the first three months are primarily caused by differences in previous
training and work experience and in rates of skill acquisition. Additional training is a sign
of deficiency in one of these tWo dimensions. Workers who receive additional training
may improve their skills more than others but since they start from a lower base their
productivity at the end of the training may still be below those receiving less training. If
the need for extra training is a surprise to employers, we would expect additional training
to be positively cmrelated with turnover. However, many employers appear to anticipate
16
which new hire will require extta ttaining. Evidence for this conclusion comes from
Bishop's (1987) analysis of differentials in starting wage rates where it was found that
lower starting wage rates are offered to new hires who require greater than average
amounts of ttaining. If they discovered the need for extra ttaining after the fact, we would
further expect the wage penalty associated with additional training to grow with tenure.
This, however, does not occur during the first year. Bishop (1987) found that the wage
penalty per 100 hours of ttaining was 2 percent for starting wage rates and 2.4 percent for
the current or most ~ent wage rate. This suggests that some new hires are recruited for
their potential, not for their experience. Extra ttaining can, therefore, signal a belief in the
worker's potential. Under these circumstances there is no reason to expect higher overall
turnover for these employees. This is confirmed by the analysis, for the coefficient on
training in the tenure equation is small and not significant.
Who initiates turnover is a different issue altogether. The effect of ttaining on who
initiates turnover depends on how the costs and benefits of training are shared. The
training is inevitably partially specific and partially general. It raises productivity in the
fmn the most, but productivity outside the finn rises as well. Despite the partially general
character of the ttaining, it appears that most of the costs and most of the quasi rents
generated by the training are incurred and received by employers. Evidence of this is (1)
the small magnitude of the starting wage penalty for the new hires that require additional
training, (2) the fact that the negative wage differential does not turn positive after the
training is over and (3) the general finding that wage rates of individuals respond only
modestly to the individual's productivity (Bishop 1987). If this is the case, extra training
increases the employer's stake in the employee in a way that it does not increase the
--.2
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employee's stake in the job. It should, therefore, lower the firm's propensity to dismiss or
layoff the employee.
The results strongly support this hypothesis. One hundred hours of additional
training during the first quarter lowers the probability of being flI'ed or laid off during the
subsequent period by 7 percentage points. It should also correspondingly increase the
employee's propensity to quit. Their marketability outside the firm has improved but their
wage rates remain behind their compatriots at the £inn. This hypothesis was tested and the
point estimate of the effect implies that an additional one hundred hours of training raises
quit probabilities by 5 percentage points. However, the coefficient is not significant at
conventional levels.
Interactions with Employer Characteristics
In the introduction it was hypothesized that the response of turnover to productivity
would depend on unionization and the size of the establishment relative to its local labor
market. These hypothesis were tested by specifying that the coefficients on the
productivity differentials themselves depend on the logarithm of the number of employees
at the establishment (Sj)' its degree of unionization (Vj) and the logarithm of emploYment
in the local labor market (Lj):
al =a I + 9lUj + 82(SrS) + 83(LrL)
(3)
-
bl =b I + ~IUj + ;2(SrS) + ~ J(LrL)
Productivity at the end of the fU"Stquarter is the productivity variable for which the
.....
interactions are specified. In order to make the main effects coefficients, i 1 and b If
more interpretable, establishment size and labor market size were deviated from their
..
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respective means for the full NCRVE employer survey (5=2.85, L=11.25) before being
multiplied by productivity. As a result, the main effects coefficients (i' It b -1) describe the
turnover response to productivity in week 3-13 at a nonunion establishment with 17.3
employees in a community with a labor force of 77,000. The results reponed in table 2
demonstrate again that productivity during week 3 through 13 is the most important
determinant of turnover. At our typical employer, a one standard deviation (0.143) rise in
the productivity repon raises expected tenure by 31 percent at a nonunion company with
17 employees. It lowers the probability of being discharged or laid off by 11 percentage
points and the probability of quitting by 6.4 percentage points.
Now we turn to the effects of unions on the response of turnover to productivity.
In the layoff/dismissal equation the coefficient on the unionization interaction is
significantly positive and slightly larger than the main effects coefficient. This implies that
relative job perfonnance has no effect on one's probability of being laid off or dismissed
at union establishments. This is consistent with other research which has shown that
unions increase layoffs and reduce dismissals (Freeman and Medoff 1984). The
interactions of productivity with establishment size and labor market size have the right
sign and are highly significant. The results imply that the types of finns that choose not
to vary wage rates with productivity (large finns in small labor markets) tend to
compensate for this by being quicker to fire workers who are less productive. Being one
standard deviation less productive at the end of the fU'Stquarter raises the probability of a
layoff or dismissal by 17 percentage points at a fmn with 200 employees and by 6.4
percentage points at a fmn with 10 employees. Being one standard deviation less
productive at a fmn with 17.3 employees raises the probability of being dismissed 16
-- --.----
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percentage points in a small community with a labor force of about 19,000 (1/4 the
geometric mean). If the local labor force is about 300,000, the probability of being
dismissed goes up only 5.7 points.
Fama hypothesized that more productive employees are more likely to quit if they
perceive little contingency in the reward structure. The analysis of quit probabilities
suppons his behavioral hypothesis for the types of fmns that reward higher productivity
with higher wage rates (small companies in large labor markets) were more likely to have
their worst performers quit and were less likely to have their best performers quit. At
establishments with 10 employees a worker who is one standard deviation more productive
is 8.6 percentage points mlikely to quit. At establishments with 400 employees, the
more productive worker is 2.5 percentage points ~ likely to quit. As a result, the
predicted tenure of the more productive employee (by one SD) is about 40 percent greater
at establishments with 10 employees but only 20 percent greater at the 400 employee fmn.
In labor markets of 300,000, a worker who is one standard deviation more
productive is 12 percentage points less likely to quit than the typical new hire. If the
labor market has only 19000 workers, the more productive worker is only 2 percent less
likely to quit. As labor market size increases, the increasing sensitivity of quits to
productivity tends to offset the declining sensitivity of dismissals to productivity. The
result is that tenure's response to productivity does not change with labor market size.
IV. Trainini. Productivity and the Incidence of Promotions
About one-third of the sample of new hires was promoted before the interview
The results of the estimations predicting promotions are presented in the fourthdate.
column of Table 2 and Table 3.
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Productivity Effects
Productivity during the 3d-12th weeks on the job was by far the single most
important detenninant of an individual's likelihood of promotion. Since promotion is a
change of fonnal status in the fmn's hierarchy, one would expect it to be at least as
responsive to changes in job perfonnance as to its level. Since initial productivity is
controlled, the coefficient on productivity during the 3rd-13th weeks characterizes the effect
of gains in the worker's perfonnance. If two new hires are equally productive in the first
two weeks, and then one becomes one standard deviation more productive than the other
by the end of the first quarter, that employee is 17 percentage points more likely to be
promoted.
A steady perfonnance advantage has a smaller effect. A new hire who is steadily
one standard deviation more productive than a peer has a 8.6 percentage point higher
probability of being promoted. The coefficients on reported initial productivity are negative
and statistically significant This implies that low productivity in the initial weeks on a job
is not held against a new employee being considered for promotion if learning is rapid and
high levels of productivity are attained by the end of the fU'Stquarter at the finn.
There are a number of reasons for expecting the size of a plant to influence the
level and detenninants of promotions. At a large company job definitions are fonnalized
so a change in job assignment generally requires a promotion. The pay system is
formalized as well so promotions are necessary if a worker is to be given a wage increase
recognizing the completion of training or outstanding performance. At small finns pay and
job assignments can be changed without a promotion being involved. For all these reasons
one would expect promotions to be more common at large fmns. With more promotions
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to hand out we would also expect the sensitivity of promotions to productivity and training
differentials to be greater at large finns than small finns. When a large finn hires for
potential rather than experience, the new hire is generally placed at a lower grade level
than new hires with experience. When training is completed, a promotion would probably
be automatic. At small finns training is more infonnal and promotions would often not
result.
These hypotheses were tested by interacting productivity and training with
establishment size. Who gets promoted appears to be more sensitive to the worker's
productivity and training at large establishments than at small establishments. The
coefficients on the size interactions are both significantly positive. If the establishment has
200 employees rather than 17, a one standard deviation productivity advantage raises one's
promotion likelihood by 26 percentage points rather than 17 percentage points.
Trainin~ Differential Effects
There is a clear tendency for those who receive more intensive training in the flI'St
3 months on a job to have a higher probability of subsequently being awarded a
promotion. A 100 hour increase in training during the fll'St3 months is associated with a
7.5 percentage point higher probability of promotion at companies with 17.3 employees.
At establishments with 200 employees, 100 hours of additional training are associated with
a 25 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion. The positive effect of
training on promotions contrasts with Bishop's findings regarding training's impact on wage
increases. When models similar to (1) and (2) were estimated predicting wage increases,
training intensity had no significant effects when productivity realizations were controlled.
It would appear that wage increases are based entirely on the success of the training (as
. ,
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measured by improvements in the productivity ratings) whereas promotions result from both
the fact of training and its degree of success.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Job matching has been proposed as a potentially major cause of the tendency of
wage rates to rise with tenure. This can occur only if the likelihood of separating from
the firm is negatively related to the productivity of individual workers at the firm. Until
now efforts to test this theory against human capital theory and to determine its empirical
importance have foundered on the absence of the data sets with measures of the worker's
performance on the job. This paper presents an analysis of a unique data set which
contains measures of the employer component of match quality--supervisor productivity
ratings of individual employees. Models of the dependence of voluntary and involuntary
turnover on match quality were estimated in this data.
The major findings are that both involuntary and voluntary turnover are negatively
related to employer productivity ratings at small and medium sized nonunion establishments
but not at large establishments and not at unionized establishments. At unionized
establishments and large nonunion establishments, only discharges are negatively selective
on job performance. Quits and layoffs which account for 90 percent of the separations at
unionized establishments and over 80 percent of the separations at large nonunion
establishments appear to be positively related to the worker's reponed productivity.
Positively selective quitting behavior occurs exactly where Fama hypothesized it would: at
the types of firms that do not have contingent reward structures.
In principle a firm could compensate for a lack of carrots--wage rewards for job
performance-and the resulting positive selectivity of quits by using the stick of dismissals
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more frequently and more contingently. To some degree large nonunion fmns do just that
for involuntary separations at these finns are highly contingent on job perfonnance. This
tendency does cause tenure to be positively associated with productivity at large nonunion
establishments but the association is nevenheless significantly weaker than it is for small
and medium sized nonunion establishments.
The results indicate that while job matching is an important phenomenon at most
small and medium sized establishments, it does not account for a significant share of the
rise in average productivity that occurs in the first year of tenure on the job. Table 4
presents calculations of the increase in average productivity that results from the fact that
separations are not random with respect to the worker's productivity and compares these
effects to the total increase in productivity that the supervisors reponed had occurred in the
first year on the job. Turnover lowers the average productivity of the work force at
unionized establishments. The positive effects of sorting on average productivity at
nonunion establishments diminish with the size of the establishment. Even in the smallest
establishments, where try out hiring seems to be most common and sorting most powerful,
the effect is a modest 3.7 percent increase in average productivity. By contrast, the total
increase in the reported productivity of new hires between the flI'St two weeks on the job
and the interview date ranged from 58.2 percent at small nonunion establishmenb to 94
percent at large nonunion establishments. Even at the small establishments where the
model is most applicable, sorting accounted for less than ten percent of the total increase
in average productivity during the 24.7 month period (on average for the small
establishments) from hiring to the interview. Clearly, there is no way the sorting model
can ever displace the training and learning by doing explanations of wage and productivity
.i
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growth.
Nevertheless. the sorting effect in the nonunion sector is comparable in magnitude
to the increase in real wage rates occwring during the first year or two on the job. Row 6
of the table is an estimate of the rise in wage rate of the new hires in the sample relative
to the BLS index of hourly earnings for the private business sector. In small nonunion
establishments. the sorting effect appears to be larger than the 2.7 percent increase in the
relative wage of stayers during the 24.7 month period between hiring and the interview.
At the large and medium sized nonunion establishments. sorting apparently accounted for
about one-third of the wage increase relative to the private sectOr hourly earnings index.
The estimates of real wage gains may have been affected by recall error and are also quite
sensitive to the details of the deflation procedure. Consequently. these estimates of the
ratio of the sorting effect to real wage gains should be treated as illustrative rather than
definitive. In other data sets and at other points in the business cycle. different ratios
would probably result Similar studies of other data sets are clearly needed.
What is not likely to change is the basic fmding that turnover is negatively selective
on the reponed productivity of individual workers in the nonunion sector and positively
selective at some unionized firms--those with low discharge rates and a noncontingent
reward structure. Other studies confum these findings. Solnick (1988) found that even
when wage increases and promotions were held constant. high performance ratings lowered
the subsequent quit rate of managerial and professional employees at a large company with
a contingent reward structure. The industrial psychology literature contains a number of
studies of the association between supervisory assessments of job performance and
subsequent turnover. The four studies of job performance's effect on involuntary turnover
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at particular business establishments found it to be strongly negative. Seven of the ten
studies of voluntary turnover found it to be negatively selective, two found it to be
essentially random, and one found it to be positively selective. Three of the six studies of
total turnover found it to be negatively selective, one found it to be essentially random and
two found it to be positively selective. McEvoy and Cascio (1987) found that artifacts like
sampling error and differences in mean turnover rates explained only a portion of the
variance in the selectivity of turnover. This suggests that there is likely to be a moderator
variable that influences the impact of job performance on turnover. Even though some of
the theories of turnover discussed at the beginning of the meta analysis make the same
point that Fama made, reward structure contingency and unionization were not among the
moderator variables examined by McEvoy and Cascio. The studies that were reviewed do
not appear to have provided the kind of information necessary to test Fama's reward
structure contingency hypothesis.6
,
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Probably the most important finding contained in table '2 is the big difference
between the rate of groWthof real wages and productivity in the fIrst year on the job.
SpecifIc training provides an explanation for the lack of wage growth in the face of
dramatic productivity groWth,but if this is the sole explanation, we are forced to conclude
that the training received is entirely specific and that employers pay for almost all of it.
This does not appear to be right, so there is probably some other factor at work as well.
This line of inquiry is pursued in Bishop and Kang (1984, 1989).
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APPENDIX ON DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
This paper is based on data from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored by the
National Institute on Education (NIE) and the National Center for Research in Vocational
Education (NCRVE) conducted between February and June 1982. The survey represented
the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers from selected geographic
areas across the country.
The flJ'St wave was funded by the U.S. Department of Labor to collect data on area
labor market effects of its Employment Opponunity Project (EOPP). The survey
encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites and 18 comparison sites selected for their similarity to
the pilot sites. The survey design specified a strategy of over sampling fums with a
relatively high proportion of low-wage workers.
The second wave attempted to interview all of the respondents in the first-wave
survey. About 70 percent of the original respondents completed surveys for the second
wave. In large organizations, the priniary respondent was the person in charge of hiring,
generally the personnel officer. When primary respondents were unable to answer a
question, they were asked if someone else in the organization would have the information,
and that part of the interview was completed with this other official. Other respondents
included comptrollers, wage and salary administrators, and line supervisors (for questions
about a particular recent hire).
The multivariate analysis uses information from a subsample of employers who gave
information on two different recent hires for the same job. The 3,412 employers who
received the full questionnaire were asked to select "the last new employee your company
hired prior to August 1981 re~ardless of whether that person is still employed by your
- -
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company." A total of 818 employers could not provide infonnation for a recent new hire
because they had not hired anyone in recent memory. The employers that provided
infonnation on one new hire were asked to provide data on a second new hire in the same
job but with contrasting amounts of vocational education. Of the 2.594 employers that
provided data on 1 new hire, 1,511 had not hired anyone else in that iob in the last 2
years, and 424 had not hired anyone with a different amount of vocational training for that
position in the last 2 years. As a result, data are available for 659 pairs of individuals
who have the same job at the same establishment. Missing data on specific questions used
in the model further reduced the sample used for estimation to about 480. Most of the
establishments from which paired data are available are smalL Seventy percent have fewer
than 50 employees. and only 12 percent have more than 200 employees.
The productivity indexes are assumed to be proportional transfonnations of true
productivity plus a random error. H this assumption is true. percentage differences in cell
means of the productivity index can be interpreted as unbiased estimators of percentage
differences in true productivity. If the variations in the productivity scores assigned by
supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true productivity, our estimates of
the effect of productivity on turnover will be biased downward. Even though it is possible
for a worker's true productivity to be negative. the scale was defined as having a lower
limit of zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be
negatively correlated with the true value. H this were the case. the result would be (a) an
understatement of percentage rates of growth of productivity in the flI'Styear on the job,
(b) an understatement of the productivity differences between movers and stayers. and (c)
an upward bias in our estimate of the effect of a 10 percent productivity differential on
~..._---
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turnover. In our view, this latter type of bias is more likely than the former. In the
multivariate analysis the final and probably the most source of bias is measurement error.
This biases the estimated effects of productivity on turnover toward zero.
Further support for the proposition that the proportionality assumption results in an
understatement of percentage increases in productivity with tenure comes from comparing
the coefficients of variation of productivity in this and other data sets. If pairs of workers
who are still at the fmn are used to construct a coefficient of variation for this data set, it
averages .13 for sales clerks, clerical, service and semi-skilled blue collar workers. This
estimate of the coefficients of variation is smaller than the estimates of the coefficients of
variation for yearly output derived from analysis of objective ratio scale measures of
output. These estimates were .265 for sales clerks, .14 for semi-skilled blue collar
workers, .167 for workers in routine clerical jobs, .255 in clerical jobs requiring decision
making and .206 in service occupations (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). This means
that the estimates of the differences between movers and stayers and of percentage growth
rates of productivity during the f11"styear on the job reported in this paper are probably
conservative. Each employer surveyed was asked about the training provided to the two
new employees, current and starting hourly wage rates and an average rate paid to workers
with 2 years of experience, and the productivity of each new hire at various points in their
tenure. A copy of the relevant portions of the questionnaire can be obtained from the
author.
Data were obtained on the amount of time that is devoted to training new
l
employees during their fmt 3 months. Separate questions were asked about training hours
spent in formal training, informal training by management, informal training by co-workers,
-L r--:.
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and watching others do the job.7 For the sample of finns and jobs, the means for the
typical worker were 47.3 hours watching others do the job, 10.7 for formal training
programs, 51 hours for informal training by management and 24.2 hours for informal
training by co-workers.
A training time index was constructed that valued and then combined the time
invested in training activities during the first 3 months on the job. The management staff
member who provided formal and informal training were assumed to be paid 1.5 times the
wage of a co-worker and the trainee's time was valued as equal to 0.8 hours of co-worker
training time. When supervisors and co-workers are giving informal training to a new
employee, the trainee is almost invariably involved directly in a production activity.
Employers report that for informal training, the trainees are typically as productive while
being trained as they are when working alone. Consequently, informal training is assumed
to involve only the investment of the trainer's time. The training time index is equal to
0.8 times the hours spent watching others do the job plus 1.8 times the hours in formal
trainin! plus 1.5 times the hours in training by management plus hours in training by co-
workers.' The arithmetic mean of this index is 124 hours, implying that the value of the
time invested in training a typical new employee in the first 3 months is about 23 percent
of the output that a co-worker would produce in 3 months.
,- ..-------- .'
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FOOTNOTES
1. Lazear (1989) shows that when a fmn limits wage differentials within its work
force in order to promote cooperation and discourage sabotage, pressures are created
for workers of equal quality to sort themselves into the same fmn. Workers who
find their coworkers are distinctly less productive will tend to quit to search for an
employer with a workforce of higher average quality. Employers will feel they
must fire workers of particulary low productivity in part to maintain the morale of
the rest of his work force.
2. The second new hire of the pair was hired on average 6 months earlier and, as a
result, was paid 3.8 percent less at the start, was 6 percentage points less likely to
be at the firm at the time of the interview and had at the time of the interview or
separation 3.4 month more tenure than the f1l'stnew hire. The two hires were not
significantly different in education, gender, productivity in the first 2 weeks or the
next 11 weeks, the profitability of the new hire, temporary or seasonal nature of the
position filled, and the likelihood of being a cooperative education student when
hired. However, the second new hire was more likely to have received vocational
training, was 1.3 years younger, had .45 years fewer years of relevant experience,
was more likely to have been a friend of a current employee and less likely to have
been referred by a government agency. In order to control for the possibility of
systematic differences between the two new hires, the difference models estimated
included an intercept and controlled for the new hire's background characteristics.
r--~'--"- -------
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4.
5.
6.
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Random effects procedures for handling unobservables are not available because
these methods assume that the unobserved effects are orthogonal to included right
hand side variables--an assumption that is not tenable in this situation. The model
to be specified is linear. No effort was made to apply fixed effects to probit or
waiting time models because these models are known to be inconsistent in short
panels and data sets in which most tenure spells are truncated on the right
(Anderson 1973; Chamberlain, 1980).
Since a company remains in the sample only if both of the recent hires were
retained for at least 3 months, companies with highly seasonal jobs or with high
rates of turnover will tend not to be included in the sample on which the fixed
effects analysis is based. In the sample used in the analysis, the number of
employees at the establishment had a geometric mean of 27.
The BLS average hourly earnings index grew 5.9 percent between 1981 and 1982
and by 8.9 percent between 1980 and 1981. Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989)
get larger estimates of wage increases during the first two years because they
neglect to adjust for price and wage inflation. Their estimates of productivity
growth are lower because their beginning level of productivity is an average for
entire first quarter rather than for the first two weeks only as in table 4.
The meta analysis that is the basis of the discussion in this paragraph was
discovered after the rest of the paper was completed. Clearly it would be desireable
,
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to obtain information on the contingency of the reward structure at the case study
fmns and to re-do the meta analysis. Such an effort, however, is beyond the scope
of the CUJTentpaper. The advantage of the data analyzed in this paper is that the
data was collected in the same way from all firms and there are more than 500
establishments in the data set. This reduces the risk that the effect of the reward
structure on turnover selectivity will be disguised by differences in methods of data
collection or by idiosyncratic differences between firms.
c
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,. In a few cases, employers reported that more than 520 hours (13 weeks times 40 hours
a week had been devoted to a specific training activity during the fll'St 3 months on the
job. Although the new hire might have received training from more than one supervisor, it
is unlikely that tWo trainers were simultaneously in one-on-one contaCt with the new hire.
Consequently, the computer edit of this data changed all repons of more than 520 hours
involved in a training activity to 520.
8. The cost of the trainer was assumed to be tWo-thirdsof the foregone productivity, since
formal trainingoften involvesmore than one trainee. Thus 1.8 = (213)1.5+ .8.
t:
~. The index was constructed under an assumption that the four training activities were
,"
mutually exclusive. This implies that if the sum of the hours devoted to individual
activities is greater than 520, that a reporting error has occurred which overstates
investment in training. In the few cases where the sum of hours devoted to training
exceeded 520, the training time index was adjusted downward by the ratio of 520 to the
sum of the hours reported for individual activities. This procedure reduces the mean of the
index by about 10 percent If the sum of the hours of training was zero, it was assumed
that a response eITorhad occulTedand the training time variable was set equal to 4 hours
(about 4% of the mean).
3i
'1'able 1
..
'rheRelative Productivity of Separating Employees
Unionizec1 fton Union 'total
200+ 20-199 1-19
Empl. Elpl. Elpl.
Quit
Relative Productivity 106% 102 96 93 95
Quit Rate 11.8% 10.0 14.6 19.6 16.9
Layoff
Relative Productivity 104 109 106 93 99
Layoff Rate 14.5 4.7 3.1 5.9 5.9
Discharge
Relative Proc1uctivity 79 73 76 73 75
<' Discharge Rate 2.7 3.0 5.7 6.4 5.7
j
Number of Observations 267 173 1028 1727 3195
,.
Source: hbulations of 1982 NCRVE EDplayer SUrvey.
-
~ top row of each panel
is a ratio of the average repartec1 productivity (c1uring the 3rd through 13th
week at the firm) of new hires who subsequently separate to the average repartec1
productivity (c1uring the 3rd through 13th week) of new hires who are still
at the firm at the time of the interview. 'the bottaB row is the percent of
the samplec1 new hires who leave the firm prior to the interview date for the
specifiec1 reason. 'the union1zec1 establisbments tend to be larger than the
non-union estabU RM.nts: 27 percent have more than 200 employees and 55 percent
have between 20 and 199 employees.
TABLE 2
DETKRMII1AI1TSOF TURIfOVERAIID PROMO'fiON
Log Involuntary
Tenure Separation Quit Promotion
2.444*** (9.55) -.779***(4.51) -.491** (2.34) 1.17*** (5.77)
-.876*** (3.51) -.167 (.99) .337 ( 1. 65) -.518*** (2.61)
.026 (.64)
-.070** (2.51) .052 (1.54) .043 (1.31)
-.019 (1.2) .018* ( 1. 65) -.006 (.47) -.012 (.95)
.247* (2.56) -.037 (.60) -.128 ( 1. (2) .178** (2.32)
-.060 (1.23) .014 (.42) -.0009 (.02) .019 (.50)
-.090 (.82) +.006 (.09) .022 (.25) .048 (.55)
.070 (.42) -.023 (.20) .140 (1.02) -.025 (.19)
-.021 (.29) +.032 (.63) -.071 (1.17) .049 (.83)
-.013 (1.65) +.008 (1.43) -.0042 (.64) +.0017 (.27)
.0034 (1.62) -.00015 (.98) .000045 (.24) -.00012 (.7)
.112 (1.3) -.013 (0.02) -.131* ( 1. 88) .082 (1.2)
.593*** (2.72) .163 (1.11) .445*** (2.50) .226 (1.31)
.040 (.96) -.021 (.73) -.068* (2.00) -.019 (.58)
-.140 (1.41) .020 (.29) .243*** (2.98) -.185** (2.34)
.0080 (1.64) .00007 (.02) -.0034 (.85) .016*** (4.19)
-064 (.42) -.034 (.38) -.026 (.21) .151 (1.24)
-.090 (.62) .138 (1.40) .080 (.74) -.115 (.99)
.049 (1.49) -.015 (.66) -.012 (.46) .030 (1.13)
.585 .153 .094 .208
477 477 477 477
,', '\
Variable
Quality of Match
Productivity 3-12 weeks
Productivity
'Training 1-12 weeks
Credentials of New Hire
Years of school
~ student
Relevant vocational ed.
Private vocational ed.
Relevant experience
Relevant experience
Total experience
Total experience
Female
Conditioninq Variables
Log potential tenure
Log potential tenure2
Temporary job
Hours per week
Xnown TJ'l'C eligibility
Cfl.'fA/J'fPA
Intercept
R2
Number of Observations
t"\
-.r
r
*significant at .10 level
**significant at .05 level
***si9Dificant at .01 level
(t-statistics in parenthesis)
w
~
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'rable 3
:., 'rurnover: and Productivity
(Interactive Specification)
Log Involuntary
'!'enure Separation Quit Promotions
!'raining Intensity .045 -.084... .047 .075.*
(1.15) (3.22) (1.46) (2.38)
Productivity 2nd week
-.652*** -.197 .240 -.415**
(2.64) (1.21) (1.19) (2.10)
Productivity week 3-13 (a.t.+b.t.) 2.198*** -..756.** -.486.* 1.201*.*
(8.84) (4.61) (2.39) (6.07)
Productivity times Union (8:ut61) -.188 .878* .234 -.609
(.27) (1.89) (.41) (1.20)
'\
Productivity times log
-.301** -.172** .211** .273.**
Establishment EllplOJ'llleDt (8:z,;:z) (2.52) (2.19) (2.17) (2.63)
'- Productivity times log Local -.002 .256.*. -.257..* -.071
Labor Force (8;.,~) (.02) (3.32) (2.68) ( .71)
'.rraining Intensi ty ~iJDes .072***
Log Establishment bployment (3.48)
'.rraining Intensity ~imes .010
log Local Labor Force (.39)
R2
.574 .179 .106 .222
~-'
' '
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NOTE: ~ese models of differences between the tenure, turnover and prcmotions of two
workers in the same job have the following control variables: relevant experience and
total experience and their squares, log of potential tenure and its square, years of
schooling, gender, relevant vocational education, private vocational education, known
to be TJTC eligible when hired, subsidized by J'rPA, hours worked Per week, and working
at the firm while part of a co-op program.
~ statistics are in parentheses under the coefficient.
. significant at the lO\; level (two-sided)
.* significant at the S\; level (two-sided)
.** significant at the l\; level (two-sided)
. .
'.
